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Abstract
Modern society is critically dependent on the services
provided by engineered infrastructure networks. When
natural disasters (e.g. Hurricane Sandy) occur, the abil-
ity of these networks to provide service is often de-
graded because of physical damage to network compo-
nents. One of the most critical of these networks is elec-
tric power, with medium voltage distribution circuits of-
ten suffering the most severe damage. However, well-
placed upgrades to these distribution grids can greatly
improve post-event network performance. We formulate
an optimal electrical distribution grid design problem
as a two-stage, stochastic mixed-integer program with
damage scenarios from natural disasters modeled as a
set of stochastic events. We develop and investigate the
tractability of an exact and several heuristic algorithms
based on decompositions that are hybrids of techniques
developed by the AI and operations research communi-
ties. We provide computational evidence that these al-
gorithms have significant benefits when compared with
commercial, mixed-integer programming software.
Introduction
Natural disasters such as earthquakes, hurricanes, and other
extreme weather pose serious risks to modern critical in-
frastructure including electrical distribution grids. At the
peak of Hurricane Sandy, 65% of New Jersey’s customers
lost power (Mansfield and Linzey 2013). Recent U.S. gov-
ernment sources (Executive Office of the President 2013;
US Department of Energy 2013) suggest that new method-
ologies for improving system resilience to these events is
necessary. Here, we focus on developing methods for de-
signing and upgrading distribution grids to better withstand
and recover from these threats that are inspired by tech-
niques developed in the artificial intelligence and operations
research communities. Our approach minimizes the upgrade
budget while meeting a minimum standard of service by
selecting from a set of potential upgrades, e.g. adding re-
dundant lines, adding distributed (microgrid) generation (i.e.
wind, solar, and combined heat and power), hardening exist-
ing components, etc.
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We formulate our approach, i.e. Optimal Resilient Dis-
tribution Grid Design (ORDGDP), as a two-stage mixed-
integer program. The first (investment) stage selects from
the set of potential upgrades to the network. The second (op-
erations) stage evaluates the network performance benefit of
the upgrades against a set of damage scenarios sampled from
a stochastic distribution. We first develop an exact solution
method that shares a number of similarities with Benders
Decomposition (Vanderbeck and Wolsey 2010) by exploit-
ing decomposition across the sampled scenarios. We also de-
velop a metaheuristic that we call Scenario Based Variable
Neighborhood Decomposition Search (SBVNDS) that is a
hybrid of Variable Neighborhood Search (Lazic et al. 2010)
and the exact method. We present numerical evidence that
our exact method is more efficient than out-of-the-box com-
mercial mixed-integer programming solvers, and that our
heuristic achieves near-optimal results in a fraction of the
time required by exact methods.
Literature Review Network design problems and their
variations are generally NP-complete (Tomaszewski, Pio´ro,
and Z˙otkiewicz 2010; Nace et al. 2013; Johnson, Lenstra,
and Kan 1978). However, recent work by (Bent, Berscheid,
and Toole 2010) demonstrates that AI-based methods can
lead to substantial improvement for realistic applications.
While the specific problem of designing resilient distri-
bution systems is novel, a number of related problems ex-
ist. The flow of electric power in tree-like distribution net-
works is related to multi-commodity network flows mak-
ing our problem similar to the design of multi-commodity
flow networks with stochastic link and edge failures (San-
toso et al. 2003; Garg and Smith 2008). However, the sec-
ond stage of our formulation requires binary variables mak-
ing our problem considerably more difficult than typical
second-stage flow problems. The interdiction literature in-
cludes related max-min or min-max problems where the
goal is to operate or design a system to make it as resilient
as possible to an adversary who can damage up to k el-
ements. Such models are similar to ours if a k is chosen
that bounds the worst-case disaster (Chen and Phillips 2013;
Chen et al. 2014; Salmeron, Wood, and Baldick 2009;
Delgadillo, Arroyo, and Alguacil 2010). Binary variables
at all stages make these models computationally challeng-
ing and solvable only for small k. Here, we exploit the
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probabilistic nature of our adversary to increase the size of
tractable problems (eliminates a stage of binary variables).
In power engineering, papers have primarily focused on
resilient system operation (Golari, Fan, and Wang 2014;
Li et al. 2014; Khushalani, Solanki, and Schulz 2007) us-
ing controls such as line switching. The ORDGDP is a fun-
damental generalization of the resilient operations problem
because 1) this problem is embedded in our second stage
and 2) minimizing the number of switch actions (Li et al.
2014) can be thought of as a design problem for a single sce-
nario. Finally, there is also a general power grid expansion
planning problem for stochastic events (Jabr 2013) that is a
variant of the the single commodity flow problem, with the
twist that flows are not directly controllable. Like stochastic
multi-commodity flow, the second-stage variables are not bi-
nary.
The key contributions of the paper include:
• Computationally efficient algorithms for solving stochas-
tic network design problems with discrete variables at
each stage. The algorithms are based on hybrid opti-
mization methods similar to recent work that combines
Bender’s Decomposition with heuristic master solutions
(Raidl, Baumhauer, and Hu 2014).
• Introduction of a problem of critical importance to energy
problems where AI researchers can make significant con-
tributions. AI has made many recent significant contribu-
tions to energy problems (Hentenryck, Gillani, and Cof-
frin 2012; Reddy and Veloso 2012; Coffrin, Hentenryck,
and Bent 2012; Garg, Jayram, and Narayanaswamy 2013;
Reddy and Veloso 2013; Jain, Narayanaswamy, and Nara-
hari 2014; Reddy and Veloso 2011; Shann and Seuken
2013; Thibaux et al. 2013).
Problem Description
Nomenclature
Parameters
N set of nodes (buses).
E set of edges (lines and transformers).
S set of disaster scenarios.
Ds set of edges that are inoperable during s ∈ S.
D′s set of edges that are inoperable even though they are
hardened during disaster s ∈ S.
cij cost to build a line between bus i and j. 0 if line
already exists.
κij cost to build a switch on a line between bus i and j.
ψij cost to harden a line between bus i and j.
ζi,k cost of generation capacity on phase k at bus i.
αi cost to build a generation facility at node i.
Qijk line capacity between bus i and bus j on phase k.
Pij set of phases for the line between bus i and bus j.
Pi set of phases allowed to consume or inject at bus i.
βij parameter for controlling how much variation in
flow between the phases is allowed.
di,k demand for power at bus i for phase k.
Gi,k existing generation capacity on phase k at node i.
Zi,k maximum amount of generation capacity on phase
k that can be built at node i.
C the set of sets of nodes that includes a cycle.
λ fraction of critical load that must be served.
γ fraction of all load that must be served.
L set of buses whose load is critical.
Variables
xij determines if line i, j is built.
τij determines if line i, j has a switch.
tij determines if line i, j is hardened.
zi,k determines the capacity for generation on phase k at
node i.
ui determines the generation capacity built at node i.
xsij determines if line i, j is used during disaster s.
τsij determines if switch i, j is used during disaster s.
tsij determines if line i, j is hardened during disaster s.
zsi,k determines the capacity for generation on phase k at
bus i during disaster s.
usi indicates if the generation capacity is used at node i
during disaster s.
gsi,k generation produced for bus i on phase k during dis-
aster s.
lsi,k load delivered at bus i on phase k during disaster s.
ysij determines if the jth load at bus i is served or not
during disaster s.
fsij,k flow between bus i and bus j on phase k during dis-
aster s.
x¯sij determines if at least one edge between i and j is
used during disaster s.
τ¯sij determines if at least one switch between i and j is
used during disaster s.
xsij,0 determines if there exists flow on line i, j from j to
i, during disaster s.
xsij,1 determines if there exists flow on line i, j from i to
j, during disaster s.
Distribution Grid Modeling A distribution network is
modeled as graph with nodesN (buses) and edges E (power
lines and transformers). In the physical system, each edge
is composed of one, two, or three circuits or “phases” and
the electrical loads at the nodes are connected to and con-
sume power from specific phases (Garcia et al. 2000) (P). In
many papers, multiple phases are approximated as a single
phase with a single edge flow. However, under the damaged
and stressed conditions considered in this work, the flows
on the phases are often unbalanced, i.e. unequal, making it
important to model all phases to accurately evaluate flow
constraints on each phase. The phase flows are not directly
controllable, but are related to nodal voltages and power in-
jections by non-convex, physics-based equations (Garcia et
al. 2000). Incorporation of these equations into the current
formulation increases the complexity, however, the structure
of distribution networks enables a simplification.
The design of protection systems for the vast majority of
distribution circuits is based on the these circuits having a
tree-like structure. Therefore, although distribution grids are
often designed to contain many possible loops, switches are
used to ensure that these grids are operated in a tree or for-
est topology. While, the switches introduce binary variables
that increase the complexity of the ORDGDP, a linearized
version of the electrical power flow equations (i.e. DC power
flow) on the resulting trees is equivalent to a commodity flow
model. We use a multi-commodity flow model that models
each phase separately (Fig. 1).
The linearization of the power flow equations assumes
uniform voltage magnitude at all nodes and ignores reac-
tive power flows. In practice, we expect these are reasonable
approximations because, prior to being upgraded, the distri-
bution grid is already feasible with respect to voltage and
reactive power flows. By adding lines or distributed power
sources, we put loads closer to generation thereby reducing
voltage variability and reactive power flow and the potential
for violating unmodeled constraints. In principle, it is possi-
ble to construct solutions where this is not the case, but the
solutions to ORDGDP found by our algorithms has not re-
sulted in these situations. However, this is an important area
of future work, and we are developing methods to eliminate
solutions that violate voltage or reactive power flow limits.
Damage Modeling The ORDGDP is also defined by a set
of scenarios, S. These scenarios are provided by a user or are
drawn from a probabilistic damage model (the case here).
Each scenario is defined by the lines of the network that are
damaged and are inoperable.
Design Options We focus on four user-definable design
options in distribution networks: 1) Hardening existing lines
to lower the probability of damage, 2) Build new lines to add
redundancy, 3) Build switches, to add operating flexibility,
and 4) building distributed generation (sources of power).
Q(s) ={xs, τs, ts, zs, us :
− xsij,0Qijk ≤ fsij,k ≤ xsij,1Qijk ∀ij ∈ E, k ∈ Pij (1)
x
s
ij,0 + x
s
ij,1 ≤ xsij ∀ij ∈ E (2)
(τ
s
ij − 1)Qijk ≤ fsij,k ≤ (1− τsij)Qijk ∀ij ∈ E, k ∈ Pij (3)∑
k∈Pij
fij,k
|Pij |
(1−βij)
≤ fsij,k′ ≤
∑
k∈Pij
fij,k
|Pij |
(1+βij)
∀ij ∈ E, k′ ∈ Pij (4)
x
s
ij = t
s
ij ≤
{
0 if ij ∈ D′s
1 else
∀ij ∈ Ds (5)
l
s
i,k =
ni∑
j=0
y
s
ij
dij ,k
∀i ∈ N , k ∈ Pi (6)
0 ≤ gsi,k ≤ zsi,k +Gi,k ∀i ∈ N , k ∈ Pi (7)
g
s
i,k − lsi,k −
∑
j∈N
f
s
ij,k = 0 ∀i ∈ N , k ∈ Pi (8)
0 ≤ zsi,k ≤ Zi,kui ∀i ∈ N , k ∈ Pi (9)∑
ij∈E(C)
(x
s
ij − τsij) ≤ |V | − 1 ∀C ∈ C (10)
τ
s
ij ≤ xsij ∀ij ∈ E (11)∑
i∈L,k∈Pi
l
s
i,k ≥ λ
∑
i∈L,k∈Pi
di,k (12)
∑
i∈N\L,k∈Pi
l
s
i,k ≥ γ
∑
i∈N\L,k∈Pi
di,k (13)
x
s
, y
s
, τ
s
, u
s
, t
s ∈ {0, 1}} (14)
Figure 1: Set of feasible distribution networks
Optimization model Given a disaster s ∈ S, Q(s) in Fig.
1 defines the set of feasible distribution networks. The con-
straints ofQ(s) involve a number of well-known constraints
in the combinatorial optimization literature, including knap-
sacks, multi commodity flows, and tree constraints. In this
model, Eq. 1 is a capacity constraint on phase flows. When
the line is not built the flow is forced to 0 by xs. Eq. 2 forces
all phases to flow in the same direction, an engineering con-
straint. Eq. 3 states that the flow on a line is 0 when the
switch is open. Eq. 4 limits the fractional flow imbalance
between the phases to smaller than βij . Imbalance between
phases cannot be extreme otherwise equipment may be dam-
aged. Here, we use βij = 0.15 for transformers, and 1.0 oth-
erwise. Eq. 5 removes components in the damage set from
the network by linking the two damage sets with the harden-
ing variables. Eq. 6 requires that all or none of the load at a
bus is served. Once again, this an engineering limitation of
most networks. Eq. 7 limits the distributed generation out-
put by the generation capacity. Eq. 8 ensures flow balance
at the nodes for all phases. Eq. 9 caps the generation capac-
ity installed at the nodes. Eq. 10 eliminates network cycles,
forcing a tree or forest topology. Eq. 11 states a switch is
used only if the line exists. Eq. 12 ensures a minimum frac-
tion λ of critical load is served. Here, we generally require
λ = 0.98. Eq. 13 ensures that a minimum fraction of load is
served. Here, γ = 0.5. Eqs 12 and 13 are the resilience crite-
ria that must be met byQ(s) and are similar to the n−k− 
criteria of (Chen et al. 2014). Eq. 14 states which variables
are discrete.
One of the more difficult constraints in this formulation
is Eq. 10 due to possible combinatorics. There are a num-
ber of ways to implement cycle constraints and we use the
formulation in Fig. 2.
∑
ij∈E(C)
(x¯sij − τ¯sij) ≤ |V | − 1 ∀C ∈ C (15)
xsij ≤ x¯sij ∀ij ∈ E (16)
3− xsij − τ¯sij ≥ τsij ≥ xsij + τ¯sij − 1 ∀ij ∈ E (17)
Figure 2: Cycle constraints
While the multi-graph structure introduces a large number
of cycles, there are a relatively small number of cycles when
the multi-edges are reduced to one edge. Thus, we introduce
binary variables (linear number) for the edges of the corre-
sponding single-edge graph and enumerate the possible cy-
cles in that graph (Eq. 15). Then, Eqs 16 and 17 are used to
pass information between artificial cycle variables and the
actual line and switch variables.
For each s ∈ S,Q(s) determines the set of feasible distri-
bution networks for each s. There are some redundant vari-
ables in this formulation that improves the separability of
the problem. The ORDGDP is the minimum cost design that
falls in the intersection of all the Q(s) (Fig. 3).
Eq. 18 minimizes the cost of building lines and switches,
hardening lines, and building facilities and generation. For
notational simplicity, existing lines, switches, and genera-
min
∑
ij∈E
cijxij +
∑
ij∈E
κijτij +
∑
ij∈E
ψijtij
+
∑
i∈N
αiui +
∑
i∈N ,k∈Pi
ζi,kzi,k (18)
s.t. xsij ≤ xij ∀ij ∈ E, s ∈ S (19)
τ
s
ij ≤ τij ∀ij ∈ E, s ∈ S (20)
t
s
ij ≤ tij ∀ij ∈ E, s ∈ S (21)
z
s
i,k ≤ zi,k ∀i ∈ N , k ∈ Pi, s ∈ S (22)
u
s
i ≤ ui ∀i ∈ N , s ∈ S (23)
zi,k ≤ Mi,kui ∀i ∈ N , k ∈ Pi (24)
(x
s
, τ
s
, t
s
, z
s
, u
s
) ∈ Q(s) ∀s ∈ S (25)
x, τ, t, u ∈ {0, 1} (26)
Figure 3: Optimal Resilient Distribution Grid Design
tion are included as variables in the objective with 0 cost,
however in practice these enter the formulation as constants.
Eqs. 19 through 24 tie the first stage (construction) decisions
with second stage variables (Q(s)). Eq. 25 states that the
mixed-integer vector (xs, τs, ts, zs, us) constitutes a feasi-
ble distribution network for scenario s.
Chance Constraints For some networks, a very small
number of scenarios in S may drive the total cost in Eq. 18.
In real-world applications, the designer of the network may
lower the total investment cost by accepting some risk of not
always satisfying the resiliency criteria. In these situations,
we can relax Eqs. 12 and 13 to a set of chance constraints:
P
( ∑
i∈L,k∈Pi l
s
i,k ≥ λ
∑
i∈L,k∈Pi di,k ∀s ∈ S∑
i∈N ,k∈Pi l
s
i,k ≥ γ
∑
i∈N ,k∈Pi di,k ∀s ∈ S
)
≥ 1−  (27)
When assuming the scenarios follow a uniform distribu-
tion, this is equivalent to stating that these constraints are
violated in |S| of the scenarios. Thus, we can restate these
constraints as:∑
i∈L,k∈Pi l
s
i,k ≥ λ
∑
i∈L,k∈Pi di,k(1− vs) ∀s ∈ S∑
i∈N ,k∈Pi l
s
i,k ≥ γ
∑
i∈N ,k∈Pi di,k(1− vs) ∀s ∈ S∑
s∈S vs ≤ |S|
(28)
Algorithms
In this section we discuss the algorithms we developed
for solving the ORDGDP. ORDGDP is a two-stage mixed
integer programming (MIP) problem with a block diago-
nal structure that includes coupling variables between the
blocks. We developed an exact algorithm that is vastly more
efficient than a commercial state-of-the-art MIP solver. We
then used the exact algorithm to develop a hybrid with vari-
able neighborhood search that is competitive with the exact
solver and is better than a heuristic used by the industry.
Scenario-Based Decomposition (SBD) Decomposition is
often used for solving two-stage stochastic MIPs, and it can
be applied to ORDGDP after the following key observation:
Observation 0.1 The second stage variables do not appear
in the objective function, therefore any optimal first stage so-
lution based on a sub set of the second stages and is feasible
for all second stage sub problems is an optimal solution.
Based on this observation we can apply SBD to solve
the ORDGDP. At high level, this algorithm solves problems
with iteratively larger sets of scenarios until a solution is ob-
tained that is feasible for all scenarios. The algorithm takes
as input the set of disasters (scenarios) and an initial sce-
nario to consider, S′. Line 2 solves ORDGDP on S′, where
P (S′) and σ∗ are used to denote the problem and solution
respectively. Line 3 then evaluates σ∗ on the remaining sce-
narios in S \ S′. The function l : P ′(s, σ∗) → R+, is an
infeasibility measure that is 0 if the problem is feasible, pos-
itive otherwise. This is implemented by maximizing the re-
liability constraints, i.e. total and critical demand satisfied.
It measures the gap between the delivered and the required
demand (the right hand side of the Eqs. 12 and 13). This
function prices the current solution over s ∈ S \ S′. If all
prices are 0, then the algorithm terminates with solution σ∗
(lines 4-5). Otherwise, the algorithm adds the scenario with
the worst infeasabilty measure to S′ (line 7).
This scenario-based decomposition shares a number of
key features with Benders decomposition (Vanderbeck and
Wolsey 2010). Both Benders and SBD solve the subprob-
lems based on iterative solves to the first-stage problem.
Benders will typically add a single constraint in the form
of cut that represents a facet of the subproblem, whereas in
SBD we add the entire polyhedron associated with the sub-
problem. Benders is a successful approach on similar ex-
pansion, commodity flow, and interdiction problems, but is
unsuccessful here due to the non-convex (discrete) nature of
the second stage. Hence our generalization to SBD.
Algorithm 1: Scenario Based Decomposition
input: A set of disasters S and let S′ = S0;
1 while S \ S′ 6= ∅ do
2 σ∗ ← Solve P (S′);
3 I ← 〈s1, s2 . . . s|S\S′|〉 s ∈ S \ S′ :
l(P ′(si, σ∗)) ≥ l(P ′(si+1, σ∗));
4 if l(P ′(I(0), σ∗)) ≤ 0 then
5 return σ∗;
6 else
7 S′ ← S′ ∪ I(0);
8 return σ∗
Greedy Algorithm A computationally efficient way of
generating feasible solutions to the ORDGDP relaxes the
coupling first stage variables and solves each scenario s ∈ S
individually. The solutions are combined by taking the max-
imum of each construction variable (X = x∪ τ ∪ t∪ z ∪ u)
over all scenarios (Algorithm 2). The switch construction
cost is determined by switches that are needed to reduce the
network into a tree for every scenario (line 4). Although the
Greedy Algorithm is simple and fast, it rarely results in an
optimal investment decision. However, it is representative of
the types of heuristics used by the industry: see Reference
(Munoz et al. 2014) for a survey.
Algorithm 2: Greedy
input: A set of disasters S;
1 for s ∈ S do
2 σs ← Solve(P ′(s));
3 σ∗(x) = max{σs(x)|∀s ∈ S}, ∀x ∈ X ;
4 Update σ∗(xi) with switches to preserve feasibility;
5 return σ∗
Variable Neighborhood Search To overcome the limita-
tions of greedy heuristics like Algorithm 2, we developed
an approach based on Variable Neighborhood Decomposi-
tion (VNS) Search (Lazic et al. 2010). The algorithm fixes
a subset of first stage variables to their current value and
searching the remaining variables for a better solution. If all
the first stage variables are fixed, the problem decomposes
into |S| separate problems that are easily solved and provide
heuristic justification for focusing on first stage variables.
More formally, P (σ, J) denotes the problem with first stage
variables, J ∈ X ,fixed to σ, i.e. xj = σ(xj), and PLP is the
LP relaxation of problem P .
Algorithm 3 describes the VNS procedure. Line 1 com-
putes the solution to the LP relaxation of the ORDGDP,
(σLP ). Line 4 counts the number of variable assignments
that are different between the solution to LP relaxation
(σLP ) and the best known solution σ∗ (σ(x) denotes the
variable assignment of x in solution σ). Line 5 orders the
variables of X by the difference between their assignments
in σ∗ and σLP . Heuristically, those variables whose assign-
ments are furthest from their LP assignment represent good
opportunities to improve σ∗. The algorithm updates the rate
at which the neighborhood size is increased (step) based on
whether or not the algorithm is in a restart situation (lines
8 and 11). If the algorithm is in a restart, the ordering of
the variables are also randomized (line 9). Line 13 computes
the best solution in the neighborhood of σ where the first
k elements of J are fixed. If the resulting solution is bet-
ter, then the algorithm proceeds with a new σ∗ (lines 15-
18)–f is used as shorthand for Eq. 18. Otherwise, the size
of the neighborhood is increased (lines 20-23). The itera-
tions terminate when the maximum number of restarts is
reached (line 2), the maximum number of neighborhood re-
sizings is reached (line 12), or a time limit is reached. In
this paper, MAXRESTARTS = 10, MAXITERATIONS = 4,
MAXTIME = 48 CPU hours, and d = 2.
Scenario-based Variable Neighborhood Decomposition
Search (SBVNDS) Given that we have a powerful ex-
act method in Algorithm 1 as well as a VNS in Algorithm
3, the natural algorithm hybridizes these approaches to get
Algorithm, SBVNDS. The algorithm proceeds exactly the
same same as Algorithm 1, except that the exact solver for
Solve(P (S′)) is replaced by VNS in line 2.
Empirical Results
The algorithms were implemented using the CPLEX C++
API with Concert technology as a 32 threaded application
Algorithm 3: Variable Neighborhood Search
input: σ′, MAXTIME, MAXRESTARTS and MAXITERATIONS;
1 Let σLP ← Solve(PLP ), σ∗ ← σ′, restart← false;
2 while t < MAXTIME and i < MAXRESTARTS do
3 j ← 0;
4 n← |x ∈ X : |σ∗(x)− σLP (x)| 6= 0|;
5 J ← 〈pi1, pi2 . . . pi|J|〉 ∈ X :
|σ∗(pii)− σLP (pii)| ≤ |σ∗(pii+1)− σLP (pii+1)|;
6 if restart then
7 i← i+ 1;
8 step← 4n
d
, k = |X | − step;
9 shuffle(J)
10 else
11 step← n
d
, k = |X | − step;
12 while t < MAXTIME and j ≤ MAXITERATIONS do
13 σ′ ← Solve(P (σ∗, J(1, . . . , k));
14 if f(σ′) < f(σ∗) then
15 σ∗ ← σ′;
16 i← 0;
17 restart← false;
18 j ← MAXITERATIONS;
19 else
20 j ← j + 1;
21 k = k − step
2
;
22 if j > MAXITERATIONS then
23 restart← true;
24 return σ∗
on Intel XEON 2.29 GHz processors. Since these are plan-
ning problems, in principle, practitioners could utilize days
of CPU time to produce a plan. However, in order to produce
a wide range of results, we limited the algorithms to 48 hours
of CPU time. Our problems are based on a modified version
of the IEEE 34 bus systems (Kersting 1991) (see Fig. 4) that
are representative of medium sized distribution systems. 1
Scenarios for this paper are based on damage caused by
ice storms, whose intensity tends to be homogeneous on the
scale of distribution systems (Sa 2002). Intensities are mod-
eled as damage rates per mile on power poles and are trans-
formed into the probability a power line segment of one mile
length is damaged (a pole has failed). Empirically, we find
that 100 randomly created scenarios is sufficient to capture
the salient features of the distribution. Each scenario con-
tains two sets of line failures, one for hardened lines (D′s)
and a second for lines that are not hardened (Ds).
Table 1 provide results when hardened lines are not dam-
aged or are damaged at rates of 1100 or
1
10 of the unhard-
ened rate. There are a number of important observations in
these tables. First, CPLEX by itself is computationally un-
competitive. Only when the hardened lines are not damaged,
CPLEX completes within the time limit, but these problems
are “easier” because hardened lines are robust and relatively
inexpensive, enabling CPLEX to eliminate many solutions.
1Due to space constraints, details are omitted. We will purchase
extra pages to provide more details
Urban, Hardened lines are not damageable (a)
CPLEX Greedy SBD SBVNDS
CPU OBJ OBJ CPU OBJ CPU OBJ
10% 19984.7 322.9 1044.5 465.8 322.9 289.9 353.7
25% 166352 635.4 1643.5 8028.3 635.4 811.4 635.4
50% TO X 2021.2 2840.7 647.7 791.3 647.7
75% TO X 1874.2 991.1 652.1 692.5 652.1
100% TO X 1934.4 712.7 654.1 662.5 654.1
Rural, Hardened lines are not damageable (b)
CPLEX Greedy SBD SBVNDS
CPU OBJ OBJ CPU OBJ CPU OBJ
10% 33083.5 2337.0 3274.8 1837.9 2337.0 503.3 2337.0
25% 32170.8 2390.3 3427.6 571.0 2390.3 457.8 2390.3
50% 20840.3 2397.6 3449.9 471.2 2397.6 421.2 2397.6
75% 15556.1 2400.4 3452.7 337.5 2400.4 299.8 2400.4
100% 17225.9 2400.6 2780.6 385.8 2400.6 346.9 2400.6
Urban, Hardened lines are damaged at a 1
100
rate (c)
CPLEX Greedy SBD SBVNDS
CPU OBJ OBJ CPU OBJ CPU OBJ
10% 159166 445.8 1061.7 2232.9 445.8 2721.3 476.5
25% TO X 1441.9 14299.2 662.9 2994.7 701.5
50% TO X 1571.2 2848.7 646.0 1917.7 760.2
75% TO X 1787.3 16040.6 687.6 1481.4 687.6
100% TO X 2744.8 24270.3 1320.5 2157.5 1330.5
Rural, Hardened lines are damaged at a 1
100
rate (d)
CPLEX Greedy SBD SBVNDS
CPU OBJ OBJ CPU OBJ CPU OBJ
10% 77947.9 2363.0 3375.4 759.0 2363.0 576.9 2363.0
25% TO X 8238.6 TO X 919.4 6744.3
50% TO X 12336.0 TO 9288.9 4361.8 7121.0
75% TO X 23099.5 TO X 23142.6 11500.0
100% TO X 16600.7 TO X 5879.5 9797.3
Urban, Hardened lines are damaged at a 1
10
rate (e)
CPLEX Greedy SBD SBVNDS
CPU OBJ OBJ CPU OBJ CPU OBJ
10% TO X 859.1 5265.1 460.8 2505.7 594.1
25% TO X 1742.2 12530.3 961.2 2843.2 961.2
50% TO X 3133.8 34822.7 1417.2 3363.5 1555.2
75% TO X 3472.0 TO X 7486.5 1894.2
100% TO X 10479.1 TO X 32289.8 7959.4
Rural, Hardened lines are damaged at a 1
10
rate (f)
CPLEX Greedy SBD SBVNDS
CPU OBJ OBJ CPU OBJ CPU OBJ
10% TO X 7503.3 141718.0 4325.9 7756.8 4424.8
25% TO X 18021.3 TO X 21993.5 7371.9
50% TO X 28865.0 TO 12017.7 74729.0 12031.2
75% TO X 31887.0 TO 13522.2 107165.0 13500.8
100% TO X 32901.9 TO 16794.4 114354.0 16778.2
Table 1: These tables compare the performance of the algorithms when hardened lines cannot be damaged (a, b), are damaged
at 1100 the rate of unhardened lines (c, d), and damaged at
1
10 the rate of unhardened lines (e, f). The columns denoted by CPU
and OBJ refer to CPU time and objective value, respectively. We omit the CPU time of Greedy as it is always less than 60 CPU
seconds. The rows refer to the probability a 1 mile segment of a line is damaged.
(a) Urban (b) Rural
Figure 4: We generated two variations of the IEEE 34 bus
problem. Each problem contains three copies of the IEEE 34
system to mimic situations where there are three normally
independent distribution circuits that could support each
other during extreme events. These problems include 100
scenarios, 109 nodes, 118 possible generators, 204 loads,
and 148 edges, resulting in problems with > 90k binary
variables. The difference between rural (a) and urban (b) is
the distances between nodes (expansion costs).
The objective for Greedy is always worse than optimal. The
exact method SBD is much more computationally efficient
than CPLEX and is able to solve many more problems to
optimality indicating that CPLEX is unable to recognize the
scenario structure in the problems. However, SBD is sen-
sitive to which scenarios are included (function l), and if
poor choices are made, it begins to resemble CPLEX. How-
ever, the meta-heuristic SBVNDS is able to overcome these
limitations. It is much faster than SBD, and almost always
achieves the optimal solution. This indicates that heuristic
methods based on combining powerful techniques like VNS
with strong exact algorithms are very good on this type of
2-stage mixed integer programming problems.
Critical load constraint Figures 5 and 6 show some re-
sults for rural and urban problems when the required frac-
tion of critical load served is varied. In general, peaks in
CPU time correspond to discrete jumps in the amount of
load served as λ increases.
(a) CPU time (b) Objective value
Figure 5: Sensitivity of the CPU time and objective value to
changes in λ on the Urban problem for SBD when hardened
lines are not damageable. Due to short distances, the solu-
tion favors hardening many lines. The required hardening is
relatively insensitive to the amount of damage and λ. How-
ever, there are spikes in problem difficulty at transitions in λ
that require additional load service.
Chance constraints Fig. 7 shows results when the re-
siliency criteria are relaxed to the chance constraints in
Eq. 28 and  is varied. Interestingly, CPU time is not im-
pacted too greatly by damage rates. Also, the solution is rela-
tively insensitive to the choice of  as damage rates increase,
indicating that an “easier” problem with small  could be
used to approximate a solution to the harder problems.
(a) CPU time (b) Objective value
Figure 6: Sensitivity of the CPU time and objective value
to changes in λ for SBD on the Rural problem when hard-
ened lines are not damageable. Because of long distances,
the solution favors adding generation and is sensitive to the
amount of damage and λ.
(a) CPU time (b) Objective value
Figure 7: These figures show how the CPU time and solution
quality changes when chance constraints () is modified for
the Rural network, when hardened lines are not damageable.
These plots are generated by SBD.
Conclusions
We formulated, proposed and tested new algorithms to solve
the ORDGDP. Our primary contribution is an algorithm that
combines the benefits of an exact method based on scenario
decomposition with variable neighborhood search. This al-
gorithm is shown to scale well to problems that are difficult
for exact methods, without sacrificing solution quality. Fu-
ture directions include:
• Including a more accurate model of the 3-phase AC power
flow equations to better exclude infeasible solutions. Op-
tions include the DistFlow approximation in (Baran and
Wu 1989) and no-good cuts.
• Scaling to entire city-sized distribution networks.
• Including a variation of the restoration problem posed by
(Coffrin, Hentenryck, and Bent 2012).
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